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StriatumThe impulse to act for immediate reward often conﬂictswithmore deliberate evaluations that support long-term
beneﬁt. The neural architecture that negotiates this conﬂict remains unclear. One account proposes a single neu-
ral circuit that evaluates both immediate and delayed outcomes, while another outlines separate impulsive and
patient systems that compete for behavioral control. Here we designed a task in which a complex payout struc-
ture divorces the immediate value of acting from the overall long-term value,within the same outcomemodality.
Using model-based fMRI in humans, we demonstrate separate neural representations of immediate and long-
term values, with the former tracked in the anterior caudate (AC) and the latter in the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC). Crucially, when subjects' choices were compatible with long-run consequences, value signals
in AC were down-weighted and those in vmPFC were enhanced, while the opposite occurred when choice was
impulsive. Thus, our data implicate a trade-off in value representation betweenAC and vmPFC as underlying con-
trolled versus impulsive choice.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Introduction
Everyday occurrences often involve negotiating immediate tempta-
tionswhose consumptionmight jeopardize long-term goals. A common
instance is where the prospect of a large immediate reward is coupled
with a harmful yet delayed consequence, such as enjoying a cigarette
that can imperil long-term health. Behavioral ﬁndings suggest that in
this context the desire for a hedonic payoff competes with the intent
to act with foresight (Baumeister et al., 1998; Hare et al., 2009;
Hofmann et al., 2009), demanding self-control.
A longstanding notion in psychology is that resisting temptation in-
volves a competition between two competing systems (Hofmann et al.,
2009; Hofmann and Van Dillen, 2012). In support of this idea, several
experiments have found evidence for a trade-off between separate neu-
ral systems that preferentially activate when choice is driven by imme-
diate and delayed rewards respectively (McClure et al., 2004; Tanaka
et al., 2004). These systems are thought to guide choice by encoding
value on opposing time-scales, though it is unclear whether their selec-
tive involvement reﬂects the tracking of other decision components.
An alternative perspective, particularly within neuroeconomics, sug-
gests that choice is driven by a single system that represents both imme-
diate and delayed decision outcomes. In dietary choice paradigms, where
individuals choose between foods that vary along a scale of healthiness
and tastiness (Hare et al., 2009, 2011), neuroimaging supports a role forides).
. This is an open access article underthe ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) in integrating both compo-
nents of value (Hare et al., 2009; Rangel, 2013). This is reinforced by
other evidence that a common vmPFC–striatal circuit tracks the subjec-
tive value of choice options (Kable and Glimcher, 2007). The divergence
between these two perspectives remains largely unresolved.
Here, we designed a novel paradigm that required subjects to accept
or reject offers with known immediate value, presented sequentially
within a trial. The probability of receiving large or small offers depended
on past actions, such that an early acceptance of a large immediately
available offer harmed long-term earnings by diminishing the opportu-
nity for future rewards. Thus, maximizing long-run earnings sometimes
required rejecting seemingly attractive offers associatedwith a high im-
mediate payoff. In contrast to previous paradigms, long-run conse-
quences were fully deﬁned within a single outcome modality based
on knowledge of the formal structure of the task. In this way our design
permitted us to decorrelate immediate from long-term value across of-
fers, where the latter includes the delayed consequences of acting. We
usedmodel-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to in-
vestigate the neural representation of each value component and linked
this to a disposition for controlled versus impulsive action.
Materials & methods
Subjects
23 adults participated in the experiment (9 males and 14 females;
age range 18–26; mean 21.2, SD = 2.33 years). All were healthy,the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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cal problems. Subjects provided written informed consent to partake
in the study, which was approved by the local ethics board (University
College London, UK).
Training paradigm
In a conditioning phase, performed outside of the scanner, subjects
learnt stimulus–reward associations between a set of three differently
colored rectangular cues and their respective reward values. Each col-
ored rectangle corresponded to one of three possible outcomes involv-
ing receipt of 3, 5, or 7 tokens, randomized across individuals. Subjects
were instructed that each token would translate into a ﬁxed sum of
money at the end of the experiment. Each trial beganwith a central ﬁx-
ation cross presented for 1000 ms, followed by a presentation of a ran-
dompair of colored cues, one appearing to the left one to the right of the
screen. Subjects had a 2000 ms time-window to choose between these
two boxes via a left or right button press, followed by presentation of
the outcome of their choice for 1000 ms. The outcome was a written
message indicating the total number of tokens won. Subjects were
instructed to explore all options until they were conﬁdent that they
had learnt all three associations, after which they should choose the
box from the pair with the higher value. Each trial was deﬁned as either
correct if the subject chose themore valuable of the two options, and in-
correct if the less valuable optionwas chosen. To ensure adequate learn-
ing, performance was calculated over six bins of twenty trials, with all
subjects reaching a performance criterion of≥ 90% by trial 60 onwards.
Subjects were asked to verbally communicate the nature of the learnt
associations.
Task paradigm
On every trial subjects were presented with a random sequence of
trained stimuli (see the Training paradigm section), appearing individ-
ually and sequentially, with a variable inter-stimulus interval (750–
1250ms). Each stimulus, presented for 1500ms, constituted an offer re-
quiring either a go response to win the relevant number of tokens or a
nogo responsewhich lead the player to foregomonetary gain. However,
a restriction was placed on the number of offers that could be exploited
for reward on any given trial. Speciﬁcally, subjects were instructed that
they could receive between 7–9 offers out of which between 4–6 could
be accepted. The precise offer number and acceptance budget were
drawn randomly and independently on every trial under a uniform dis-
tribution, and thus every combination was equally likely. A green circle
on the top central portion of the screen turned red to indicate that a
player had exhausted their go budget, after which nogo responses
were enforced for any remaining offers.
Importantly, the value of each offer was probabilistic and governed
by a set of explicitly instructed contingencies. At trial onset, each offer
had an independent and equal probability of being worth 3, 5 or 7 to-
kens {0.33 0.33 0.33 (for 3, 5 and 7 respectively)}. Excluding the ﬁrst
offer, if a player accepted a value 7 offer before rejecting three or more
previous offers the distribution would shift such that every future
offer would have a probability distribution greatly in favor of value 3
{0.9 0.05 0.05}. Similarly, excluding the ﬁrst offer, if a player accepted
a value 5 offer before rejecting three or more previous offers the distri-
butionwould shift such that every future offer would have a probability
distributionmoderately in favor of value 3 {0.5 0.25 0.25}. The probabil-
ity distribution was updated according to the choice made on the most
recent offer. Thus a player had to consider both the immediate and long-
term consequences of a go response in order to maximize payoff across
a trial. Following the last offer, an outcome displaying the total number
of offers won was presented on the screen for 2500 ms.
All subjects received 1 block (36 trials) of training outside the scan-
ner in order to familiarize themselves with the task attributes and to di-
minish learning in the scanner. Subsequently, 108 trialswere completedin the scanner across three sessions of 36 trials. The number of tokens
won across sessions was summed and converted to a cash prize.
Due to the complex nature of the task, subjects were probed to en-
sure that they had currently understood the nature of the contingencies
that linked actions to switches in the distribution of offers. Speciﬁcally
we constructed a written set of eleven hypothetical trials, where for
each trial subjects were asked to indicate their belief in the current
offer distribution given a history of speciﬁc offers and actions. For exam-
ple, “What is the probability of the next offer beingworth 5 tokens given
that a value 7 offer was accepted at the third index and no offers had
previously been rejected?”. Subjects who failed to report the correct
offer distribution for at least nine of the eleven trials were excluded
from the experiment.
Behavioral data analysis
Within-trial modulation of choice
Within a trial, a player transitions through a number of discrete
states dependent on three ﬂuctuating variables, the number of offers al-
ready seen, the number of accepts already expended and the current
offer distribution. To assess how the probability of accepting a given
offer ﬂuctuated as a function of these variables, we split trials by offer
index (i.e. 1–9), the number of offers already rejected (i.e. 0–8), and
the current offer distribution, calculating the probability of accepting
at every possible permutation (Fig. 2A). Note that we only display be-
havior corresponding to offers where the probability distribution is
equal given that choice under this contingency is most relevant to the
questions of interest. The probability of accepting at every state was av-
eraged across all participants. For display purposes, we discard cells
with less than a total of 15 data points.
Robust logistic regression
In order to conﬁrm our hypothesis that both immediate and long-
term values show independent effects on choice (a prediction that re-
mains agnostic about the underlying neural architecture generating
choice), we used a robust logistic regression to model the dependence
of a go/nogo response (across all choice data) on immediate and long-
term values in amodel in which both regressors competed for variance.
The algorithm implemented used iteratively reweighted least squares
with a logistic weighting function. We performed one-sample t-tests
on the resulting beta coefﬁcients across subjects. A positive beta implies
that subjects are more likely to gowhen value is high.We also repeated
the logistic regression using choice data conﬁned to offers that entered
the imaging analysis (see Fig. 2A, middle panel, yellow boxes).
Computational modeling
Amajor interest here is the extent towhich subjects utilize estimates
of immediate and long-term values to guide choice.We utilized compu-
tationalmodeling to evaluate evidence that choicewas guidedpurely by
immediate value, purely by (the optimal) long-term value, or by a cor-
responding trade-off. Each model calculated the value of accepting an
offerwhichwas passed through a sigmoid function (σ) to determine ac-
tion probabilities as follows:
PA ¼
1
1þ exp −τ  VAð Þ
where VA is the expected value of accepting an offer, and τ is a temper-
ature parameter that governs the stochasticity of choices.
Immediate rewardmodel.We conjectured that subjects might choose on
the basis of immediate value, disregarding the downstream conse-
quences associated with prematurely accepting high (face) value offers,
whereby
VA ¼ IR−c1
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intercept.
IR, c1 and τ (the temperature parameter of the associated sigmoid
function) were ﬁt by maximum likelihood estimation (see the Model
ﬁtting & comparison section).
Optimal model.We built a model that calculated the optimal decision at
each offer, where optimal is deﬁned as maximizing expectation of total
reward delivery in the trial. The model assumes correct knowledge of
the structure of the task. The current state of the task was deﬁned by
three belief distributions: O, over o, the number of offers remaining, A,
over a, the number of accepts remaining, andM, the probability distri-
bution governing the value of the forthcoming offer. The expected
value of being in a state was:
SV O;Að Þ ¼
X
r¼ 3;5;7f g




r þ P oN1ð Þ  P aN1ð Þ  SV O0;A0 
where O′ is deﬁned by
P O0 ¼ o  ¼ P O ¼ oþ 1ð ÞX
o
P O ¼ oþ 1ð Þ
andA′ is deﬁned analogously. Thus going fromO toO′ orA toA′ updates
the probability distribution such that it remains uniformbut shifts to the
left. Note that calculating the recursive SV function was effectively a
search through a tree of all possible moves. The recursion ends when
P(o N 1) or P(a N 1) is 0, and SV is not evaluated.
M is deﬁned by three discrete probability distributions as follows:
M0 = {0.33 0.33 0.33}
M1 = {0.50 0.25 0.25}
M2 = {0.90 0.05 0.05}
At trial onsets,m= 0, or and is updated according to the following
rules:
If we are on the ﬁrst offer, or 3 offers have previously been rejected,
m doesn't change.
Otherwise, if a value 5 offer is accepted,m=1, and if a value 7 offer
is accepted,m= 2.
At each offer the model calculated the value of rejecting,
VR ¼ P oN1ð Þ  SV O0;A
 
and the future value of accepting,
VAF ¼ P oN1ð Þ  P aN1ð Þ  SV O0;A0
 
:
The expected value difference between accepting and rejecting, EV,
was calculated as,
EV ¼ VAF þ IR−VR
where IR represents the (face) value of the current offer.
EVwas passed through a sigmoid function to determine PA, the prob-
ability of a go response (see above).
Trade-off model. Based on evidence from our task and other studies uti-
lizing similar paradigms (Economides et al., 2014; Hare et al., 2009,
2014; Kable and Glimcher, 2007), that immediate and long-term values
exert independent inﬂuences on behavior, we hypothesized that sub-
jects' choicesmight involve a trade-off between the two values. This hy-
pothesis refers to subjects' behavior and remains agnostic as to the
neural architecture that actualizes choice. In this regard, a choice pat-
tern that utilizes both values could emerge either from a single integrat-
ed system or a dual-system architecture respectively. We speciﬁed amodel in which immediate and long-term values both contributed
independently to the calculation of expected value (TV, trade-off
value), whereby the associated trade-off was captured by a single
parameter that governed the weight placed on either value as
follows:
TV ¼ EV  c1ð Þ þ IR−c2ð Þ  1− c1ð Þ
where EV is the expected, or long-term value, derived from the op-
timal model (see above), IR is the (face) value of the current offer,
c1 governs the nature of the trade-off, and c2 represents a value
intercept.
In addition, it seemed reasonable to assume that subjects might
trade-off immediate and long-term values differently depending on
the face value of the current offer. We therefore speciﬁed a second
trade-off model in which a separate trade-off parameter governed the
weight placed on immediate and long-term values for each face value
(3, 5 and 7).
Model ﬁtting & comparison
As described in previous reports (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012; Huys
et al., 2011) we used a hierarchical Type II Bayesian (or random effects)
procedure usingmaximum likelihood toﬁt simple parameterized distri-
butions for higher level statistics of the parameters. Since the values of
parameters for each subject are ‘hidden’, this employs the Expecta-
tion–Maximization (EM) procedure. Thus on each iteration the posteri-
or distribution over the group for each parameter is used to specify the
prior over the individual parameter ﬁts on the next iteration. For each
parameterwe used a single distribution for all participants. Before infer-
ence, all parameters were suitably transformed to enforce constraints
(log and inverse sigmoid transforms).
Models were compared using the integrated Bayesian Information
Criterion (iBIC), where small iBIC values indicate a model that ﬁts the
data better after penalizing for the number of parameters. Comparing
iBIC values is akin to a likelihood ratio test (Kass and Raftery, 1995).
fMRI data acquisition
fMRI was performed on a 3-Tesla Siemens Quattro magnetic reso-
nance scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) with echo planar imaging
(EPI) and a 32-channel head coil. Functional data was acquired over
three sessions containing 280 volumes with 48 slices (664 volumes
total). Acquisition parameters were as follows: matrix = 64 × 74;
oblique axial slices angled at−30° in the antero-posterior axis; spatial
resolution: 3 × 3 × 3 mm; TR = 3360 ms and TE = 30 ms. The ﬁrst
ﬁve volumes were subsequently discarded to allow for steady state
magnetization. Field maps were acquired prior to the functional runs
(matrix = 64 × 64; 64 slices; spatial resolution = 3 × 3 × 3 mm;
gap = 1 mm; short TE = 10 ms; long TE = 12.46 ms; TR = 1020 ms)
to correct for geometric distortions. In addition, for each participant an
anatomical T1-weighted image (spatial resolution: 1 × 1 × 1 mm) was
acquired for co-registration of the EPIs.
During scanning peripheral measurements of subject pulse and
breathing were made together with scanner slice synchronization
pulses using the Spike2 data acquisition system (Cambridge Electronic
Design Limited, Cambridge, UK). The cardiac pulse signal wasmeasured
using an MRI compatible pulse oximeter (Model 8600 F0, Nonin Medi-
cal, Inc., Plymouth, MN) attached to the subject's ﬁnger. The respiratory
signal (thoracic movement) was monitored using a pneumatic belt po-
sitioned around the abdomen close to the diaphragm.
fMRI data analysis
Datawere pre-processed and analyzed using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust
Centre for Neuroimaging, UCL, London). Functional data were bias
corrected for 32-channel head coil intensity inhomogeneities, realigned
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registered to T1w images, spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurol-
ogy Institute (MNI) space (using the segmentation algorithm on the
T1w image with a ﬁnal spatial resolution of 1 × 1 × 1 mm) and
smoothed with an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. The fMRI time series
data were high-pass ﬁltered (cutoff = 128 s) and whitened using an
AR(1)-model.
For each subject we computed a statistical model by applying a
canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) combined with
time and dispersion derivatives. Using an in-house Matlab toolbox
(Hutton et al., 2011) we constructed a physiological noise model to
account for artifacts that take account of cardiac and respiratory
phases as well as changes in respiratory volume. This resulted in a
total of 14 regressors which were sampled at a reference slice in
each image volume to give a set of values for each time point. The
resulting regressors were included as confounds in our GLM at the
ﬁrst level (see below).GLM 1
In order to investigate regions tracking immediate or long-term
value, we designed a GLM that allowed us to explore the BOLD response
to a subset of offers for which immediate and long-term values were
most decorrelated, corresponding to offers between indexes 2 and 3
within a trial (see Fig. 2A, middle panel, yellow boxes). We split these
offers contingent on their face value, such that each value (3, 5 and
7) was modeled as a separate regressor. Although these offers were se-
lected fromneighboring states (meaning that for any given (face) value,
the long-term value of a go response was similar), each onset regressor
was parametrically modulated by long-term value (from the optimal
model) so as to account for variance associated with a difference in
the current state. Additional regressors included the onsets of all
within-budget offers outside of the yellow box in Fig. 2A, parametrically
modulated by both immediate and long-term values, all out-of-budget
offers (for which nogo responses were enforced), parametricallymodu-
lated by immediate value, the onset of go responses (button presses)
across the entire experiment, so as to explain awaymotor-related activ-
ity, and the onset of trial outcomes (parametrically modulated by to-
kens won). Regressors of no interest included 6 movement-related
covariates (the 3 rigid-body translations and 3 rotations resulting
from realignment) and 14 physiological regressors (6 respiratory, 6 car-
diac and 2 change in respiratory/heart rate). All regressors were
modeled as stick functions with a duration of zero and convolved with
a canonical form of the hemodynamic response function (HRF) com-
bined with time and dispersion derivatives.
To explore the BOLD response to the onset of value 3, 5 and 7 offers
when immediate and long-term values were decorrelated, we conduct-
ed a random-effects one-way ANOVA at the second level, with a single
factor (face value) and 3 levels (3, 5, 7), containing individual subject
ﬁrst-level contrast images corresponding to the ﬁrst three onset regres-
sors from our GLM. We constructed functional ROIs (fROIs) from clus-
ters that survived small volume correction for a prior volume of
interest (see the Anatomical volume of interest section) using the
MarsBar toolbox (v. 0.42) for SPM. We extracted mean parameter esti-
mates from each fROI for our three onset regressors of interest and per-
formed post-hoc paired t-tests to explore differences in BOLD response
between offer values. For display purposes, onset parameter estimates
were normalized (mean centered). In addition, we speciﬁed the con-
trast {0−1 1} corresponding to the onset of value 3, 5 and 7 offers to ex-
plore regions that covaried with the demand for control. The latter was
performed as a whole-brain analysis.
In order to test whether the BOLD response to value 7 offers in our
four ROIs was related to choice, we correlated mean parameter esti-
mates (corresponding to the value 7 onset regressor) extracted from
each ROI, with the trade-off parameter captured by our model ﬁtting
procedure. This resulted in four independent correlations.GLM 2
In order to quantify the extent to which the BOLD response was
modulated by immediate and long-term values, we built a second
GLMwhere we concatenated the ﬁrst three regressors fromGLM 1 (on-
sets of 3, 5 and 7-token offers) into a single regressor, and added a para-
metricmodulator for immediate value, whichwas forced to compete for
variance (andwas thus not orthogonalized)with an overall (long-term)
value modulator. All other regressors remained identical to those spec-
iﬁed in GLM 1.
We extracted mean parameter estimates from each ROI for the im-
mediate and long-term value parametric modulators. For each ROI and
each parametric modulator (immediate and long-term values), we con-
ducted Grubb's test to probe for extreme values so as to remove subjects
whowere signiﬁcant outliers at a threshold of p b 0.05 (8 tests in total);
however this did not result in the exclusion of any subjects. Finally we
performed one sample t-tests at the second level on the resultant
betas across the group.
GLM 3
In order to look for difference in value coding during correct and in-
correct responses, we split our regressor corresponding to the onset of
value 7 offers from GLM 1 into correct (nogo) responses and incorrect
(go) responses. All other regressors remained equivalent.
We conducted a random-effects one-way ANOVA at the second
level, with a single factor (accuracy) and 2 levels (correct, incorrect),
containing individual subject ﬁrst-level contrast images corresponding
to the go 7 and nogo 7 onset regressors. We extracted parameter esti-
mates from each ROI and performed post-hoc paired t-tests to explore
a main effect of response accuracy. We note that only 15 out of 23 sub-
jects had enough variance in their ability to respond accurately across
trials, and thus the above analysis was restricted to these individuals.
Anatomical volume of interest
We constructed an anatomical volume of interest (VOI) that includ-
ed individual valuation regions of a prior interest for the purposes of
small volume correction, effectively reducing the number of voxel-
wise comparisons. This consisted of the entire vmPFC, caudate nucleus,
putamen and ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens) (see Fig. S3). The
vmPFC and dorsal striatum were deﬁned as anatomical ROIs from the
MarsBar toolbox (v. 0.42) for SPM. For the ventral striatum we used a
group-average ROI derived from a diffusion tensor imaging
connectivity-based parcellation of the right nucleus accumbens in
humans, taken from Baliki et al. (2013). This ROI consisted of both the
core and shell subcomponents of nucleus accumbens. The right region
was ﬂipped along the x-dimension in the MarsBar toolbox to obtain bi-
lateral accumbens.
Functional regions of interest
We deﬁned functional regions of interest (fROIs) from clusters that
survived small volume correction for a pre-deﬁned VOI (see above)
when testing for regions tracking IR or EV using GLM 1 (see GLM 1
above). For the anterior caudate, we excluded voxels that fell outside
of an anatomical ROI for bilateral caudate from the MarsBar toolbox.
These fROIs were used for all remaining fMRI analyses. All ROI analyses
were performed using the MarsBar toolbox (v. 0.42) for SPM.
Results
In every trial, subjects received between 7–9 offers, but an imposi-
tion of a limited “budget” meant that they could only accept between
4–6 offers. Importantly, we penalized acceptance of the largest (7-
token) and second largest (5-token) offers early in a trial by
impoverishing remaining offers in that trial, where the penalty scaled
with the face value of the current offer (see Fig. 1 and the Materials &
Fig. 1.Task schematic. In thepre-scanning training (not shown), subjects learnt to associate three distinct color stimuli with a token value of 3, 5 or 7,with each tokenwon translated into a
cash prize at the end of the experiment. In the actual experiment proper (shown above), a player was presented with a sequence of stimuli, each constituting an individual offer. These
offers required a go response to win or a nogo response to forego a gain. Crucially, a restriction was placed on the number of offers that could be exploited per trial sequence, such that on
every trial a player could receive an overall amount of 7–9 offers but where only 4–6 (go budget) could be accepted, with every combination being equally likely. A green circle at the top
central portion of the screen turned red to indicate players had exhausted their go budget, after which they passively observed the remaining sequence of outstanding offers. At trial onset,
each offer had an equal probability of being the color associated with 3, 5 or 7 tokens {0.33 0.33 0.33, respectively}.With the exception of the ﬁrst offer, if a player accepted a value 7 offer
before rejecting at least three previous offers, the distributionwould shift in favor of value 3 offers for the remainder of the sequence {0.9 0.05 0.05}. Likewise, if a player accepted a value 5
offer before rejecting at least three previous offers, the distribution would modestly shift in favor of value 3 offers {0.5 0.25 0.25}. The current distribution was updated based on themost
recent action. Thus, an optimal player had to track the immediate reward environment as well as calculate overall (long-term) value by taking account of how an immediate go response
might impact on future reward abundance, entailing often rejecting an offer associated with a large immediate reward.
210 M. Economides et al. / NeuroImage 109 (2015) 206–216methods section). Here, immediate value equates to the face value of
each offer (3, 5 or 7 tokens), whereas long-term value represents the
total expected utility from accepting. Thus, long-term value includes
the face value, the cost of expending a unit of budget, and the cost of
changing the future probability of reward. In some cases, total earn-
ings could be maximized by rejecting 7-token but not 5-token offers.
This is because the penalty associated with an accept response can be
greater than the immediate payoff for 7-token, but not 5-token of-
fers. In other words, the long-term value of a 7-token offer can some-
times be negative while nonetheless yielding the highest immediate
payoff. Hence, immediate value was decorrelated from long-term
value across offers, despite the former being a component of the
latter.
Given the complexity behind the rules governing how actions
shaped future offers, subjects were probed prior to scanning to ensure
that they correctly understood the contingencies of the task (see the
Materials & methods section). In brief, each subject was shown a series
of hypothetical trials where they had to predict the probability of a
forthcoming offer being a speciﬁc value, given a preceding sequence of
offers and actions. All subjects demonstrated correct understanding of
the task and were fully aware of the contingencies linking actions to
states following careful instruction. In addition, in order to minimize ef-
fects of learning and uncertainty during scanning, subjects played one
block (36 trials) of the task prior to performing the experiment in the
scanner.
In Fig. 2A, we plot subjects' propensity to accept a given offer value
(3, 5 or 7 tokens) as a function of the number of offers already received
and the number already accepted/rejected in a trial. Note that here we
only plot choice behavior for periods in a trial where the offer distribu-
tion is uniform and thus any penalty for prematurely accepting a high
value offer has not been instantiated. Although self-control is multi-
faceted, one important aspect is an ability to override one's impulses
or prepotent responses (Gailliot and Baumeister, 2007). In our task,
the requirement for this form of self-control is greatest near the start
of a trial, where accepting a large immediate offer has detrimental fu-
ture consequences (see Fig. 2A, middle panel, yellow boxes). In this
part of a trial, we found that subjects under-chose 3-token offers and
over-chose 5 and 7-token offers, as compared to an optimal model
(Fig. 2A). Moreover, considering the same set of offers, subjects were
faster to accept 7-token offers compared to 5-token (paired t(21) =
2.66, p=0.015) offerswhen they chose to enact a ‘go’ response, sugges-
tive of a greater prepotent tendency to reap large immediate rewards
(see Fig. S1, in which we plot the group-mean of average (mean)response times at the single subject level). We note that the large
error bar for 3-token offers in Fig. S1 represents the fact that subjects
rarely accepted 3-token offers in this part of a trial (with an average of
just 2.7 data points across subjects compared to 33.8 and 25.7 for 5
and 7-token offers respectively).
Inline Supplementary Fig. S1 can be found online at http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.12.071.
This pattern of choice is consistent with subjects being mindful of
the future consequences of their actions, but nevertheless being
over-susceptible to an inﬂuence of a current offer's face value. We
therefore predicted that both immediate and long-term values (see
the Materials & methods section for an explanation of how these
are calculated) would independently inﬂuence behavior. Using lo-
gistic regression we indeed found that immediate (one-sample
t(22) = 3.74, p = 0.001, mean b = 0.047) and long-term values
(one-sample t(22) = 16.61, p b 0.001, mean b = 0.113) were sig-
niﬁcant predictors of choice, implying that behavior was neither
exclusively optimal nor impulsive, but incorporated features of both
traits.
Given evidence that immediate and long-term values exert a differ-
ential impact on action selection, we conjectured that a model
encompassing a trade-off between each valuationwould capture choice
behavior. We used Bayesian model comparison to evaluate whether
group behavior was driven exclusively by immediate value, by long-
term value, or by a trade-off between the two (see the Materials &
methods section). We found that a model in which each offer value
(3, 5, 7) was assigned an independent trade-off parameter captured
group-level choice best (Fig. 2B) (see Table S1 for a summary of best-
ﬁtting parameter estimates). Further, in order to provide an intuitive
understanding of the goodness-of-ﬁt of the different models tested,
we calculated pseudo-r2 statistics for each model (see Table S2 for a
summary), using Cox and Snell's method (Cox and Snell, 1989). We
note that compared to a baseline intercept model, we identiﬁed a
mean r2 value of 0.490 (95% CI [0.416, 0.563]) for the winning ﬁve-
parameter model.
Inline Supplementary Table S1 and Table S2 can be found online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.12.071.
Hence, while subjects were considerate of future consequence, im-
mediate rewards were (on average) overweighted across the experi-
ment. The ﬁnding that subjects weight immediate and long-term
values differently depending on face value is intuitive, as long-term
value deviates from immediate value to a greater degree for some offers
compared to others, and is thus sometimes harder to track. Indeed, the
Fig. 2. Behavioral results. (A) Plotted above are subjects' mean probability of offer acceptance as a function of the number of offers already seen (ranging from 1–9) and number of offers
already rejected (ranging from 0–8) in a trial, split by offer value (3, 5, 7) (top panel). The spectrum runs from blue (p = 0) to red (p = 1). We stress that we have only plotted behavior
corresponding to periods in a trial where the offer distribution is uniform and thus any penalty for prematurely accepting a high value offer has not yet been instantiated. Compared to an
optimalmodel inwhich choice is dictated by correctly inferring long-term value (middle panel), subjects under-accept value 3 offers and over-accept value 7 offers at the start of trials (top
panel; based on groupmean data, n = 23). This discrepancy is rectiﬁed by a model in which immediate and long-term values trade off for behavioral control (lower panel). We note that
the lower panel illustrates choice predicted by the trade-off model based onmean group parameter ﬁts (n= 23). The yellow boxes in themiddle panel demonstrate offers for which im-
mediate and long-term values aremaximally decoupled, and those for which all fMRI analyses are centered on.We note that for display purposes, we discarded cells with less than a total
of 15 data points across subjects. (B)Model comparison showed that a model inwhich each offer value (3, 5, 7) is assigned a separate parameter that governs howmuchweight is placed
on immediate versus long-term value in the associated trade-off ﬁts behavior better than alternatives, indicated by its lowest iBIC score (3 trade). These alternatives included a model in
which a single parameter governs the trade-off (1 trade), a model dependent on optimally inferring long-term value (optimal), and a model driven purely by immediate value (immedi-
ate). The number of free parameters is indicated in brackets for eachmodel. (C) Pair-wise scatter plots show individually ﬁt trade-off parameters (c1, see theMaterials &methods section)
from the winning model for 3 versus 5-token offers, 3 versus 7-token offers, and 5 versus 7-token offers. A trade-off value closer to 0 indicates that behavior is predominantly driven by
immediate value, while a value closer to 1 indicates that behavior is predominantly driven by long-term value. Each circle represents one participant.
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strongly each player weighted immediate relative to long-term value
for the three offers, strongly endorse this account (Fig. 2C). We provide
examples of single subject data that illustrates how individuals varied
widely in their ability to prioritize long-term value (in the face of large
immediate rewards), ranging from the most controlled with respect to
value 7 offers (trade-off parameter for value 7 closer to 1) to the most
impulsive (trade-off parameter for value 7 closer to 0) (see Fig. S2).
Inline Supplementary Fig. S2 can be found online at http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.12.071.
Since immediate and long-term values exert distinct inﬂuences on
choicewe conjectured that these quantitieswould have dissociable rep-
resentations in value sensitive brain regions. To test this, we used fMRI
and implemented a GLM (see the Materials & methods section, GLM
1) in which each offer value (3, 5, 7) was modeled separately, but fo-
cused on a subset of offers where immediate and long-term values
were maximally dissociable within any given trial (see Fig. 2A, middle
panel, yellow boxes). In this set of offers, optimal behavior mandated
strongly rejecting 7-token offers, strongly accepting 5-token offers,
and weakly accepting 3-token offers. Thus, regions representing long-
term (overall) value should display a BOLD signal proﬁle that is attenu-
ated for 7-token offers, boosted for 5-token offers andmodestly boosted
for 3-token offers. In contrast, regions that track immediate rewards
should show a BOLD signal proﬁle that increases linearly as a function
of face value. In order to ensure that behavior in this subset of offers
was similarly driven by both immediate and long-term (optimal)
values, we repeated the aforementioned logistic regression but only in-
cluded choices fromwithin the yellow boxes in Fig. 2A (thosewhich en-
tered the imaging analysis). We again observed that both immediate
(one-sample t(22) = 11.87, p b 0.001, mean b = 0.47) and long-term
value (one-sample t(22)=9.64, p b 0.001,mean b=0.49)were signif-
icantly predictive of choice. Importantly, we modeled go responses as
an independent regressor in all GLMs, and this spanned button pressesFig. 3. fMRI results. Clusters in ventral vmPFC (A) and lateral vmPFC showedgreater activation in
relative to 3 and 5-tokenoffers, consistentwith 7-tokenoffers having a negativeoverall (long-te
caudate exhibited a linearly increasing response proﬁle to the presentation of 3, 5 and 7-token o
thermore, in trials where 7-token offers were impulsively accepted (7 go) compared to reject
lateral vmPFC (C) (less negative beta), while the representation of immediate value (for 7-token
lines represent SEM. * indicates p = b 0.05; ‡ indicates p = 0.07; n.s. indicates not signiﬁcant (across the entire experiment, including those corresponding to offers
outside of the yellow box in Fig. 2A. Thus, any variance in activity attrib-
uted to cue onsets is independent from the generation of a motor re-
sponse per se.
Given our a priori interest in responses within valuation regions, we
generated a volume of interest (VOI; see Fig. S3) that included the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998;
Hare et al., 2009; Wunderlich et al., 2012), ventral striatum (Baliki
et al., 2013; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012), caudate nucleus (Tricomi
et al., 2004) and putamen (Brovelli et al., 2011) to constrain the search
space and reduce the number of statistical comparisons. We used ana-
tomical ROIs from the MarsBar toolbox (v. 0.42) for SPM and from pre-
vious research (see the Materials & methods section).
Inline Supplementary Fig. S3 can be found online at http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.12.071.
When testing for regions that track long-term value (a contrast of {0
1−1} for 3, 5 and 7-token offers) we identiﬁed two clusters that sur-
vived small volume correction (SVC) for our VOI in vmPFC, including a
ventral (Fig. 3A) and a more lateral portion (Fig. 3C). By contrast,
when testing for regions that track immediate value (a contrast of
{−1 0 1} for 3, 5 and 7-token offers) we identiﬁed activation in both
left (Fig. 3B) and right (Fig. 3D) anterior caudate nucleus that likewise
survived SVC for our VOI. These clusters were then used to deﬁne func-
tional regions of interest (fROIs) in vmPFC and anterior caudate for fur-
ther analysis, which correspond to the regions displayed in Fig. 3.
To quantify the extent to which each fROI was preferentially driven
by immediate versus long-term value, we constructed a second GLM
that allowed us to regress both values against the BOLD signal within
the same model, by collapsing offers into a single regressor and using
immediate and long-term values as parametric modulators. Note that
these regressors, for which the average correlation was r2 = 0.24,
were not orthogonalized in our GLM and were forced to compete for
variance (see the Materials & methods section, GLM 2). This analysisresponse to 5-token compared to 3-token offers, but a deactivation in response to 7-token
rm) value (see yellowboxes, Fig. 2, panel A). By contrast, both left (B) and right (D) anterior
ffers, consistent with this region showing preferential sensitivity to immediate value. Fur-
ed (7 nogo), the representation of long-term value (for 7-token offers) was attenuated in
offers) was boosted in left (B) and right (D) anterior caudate (more positive beta). Vertical
paired t-tests).
Fig. 4. BOLD response in vmPFC correlates with a measure of self-control. When
confronted with an offer associated with a high immediate value but low long-term
value, between-subject variability in ventral vmPFC BOLD response to 7-token offers
was tightly coupled with choice (r2 = 0.25, p = 0.015). The higher the signal in vmPFC,
the more choice was driven by immediate value (more positive beta, trade-off parameter
closer to 0). In contrast, the lower the signal in vmPFC, the more choice was driven by
long-term value (more negative beta, trade-off parameter closer to 1).
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t(22) = 3.21, p = 0.004, mean b = 0.148) and lateral (one sample
t(22) = 4.07, p b 0.001, mean b = 0.100) vmPFC fROIs were driven
by long-term value and not explained by immediate value (ventral:
one-sample t(22) =−0.913, p = 0.371, mean b =−0.032); lateral:
one-sample t(22) =−0.263, p = 0.795, mean b =−0.004). By con-
trast, BOLD in anterior caudatewas drivenpredominantly by immediate
value (left caudate: one-sample t(22) = 4.239, p b 0.001, mean b =
0.300; right caudate: one-sample t(22) = 4.504, p b 0.001, mean b =
0.227), though long-term value also contributed to signal variance
(left caudate: one-sample t(22) = 2.21, p = 0.038, mean b = 0.127;
right caudate: one-sample t(22) = 2.42, p = 0.024, mean b = 0.115)
suggesting that it represented mixed value components.
It has been proposed that self-control involves a conﬂict between
competing value systems (Hofmann et al., 2009; McClure et al., 2004;
Tanaka et al., 2004), and this idea gains support from evidence that
the brain draws on multiple systems when making decisions (Balleine,
2005; Daw et al., 2005; Dolan and Dayan, 2013). However, an alterna-
tive suggestion is that choice is governed by a common value system
embedded in vmPFC (Hare et al., 2009) or a vmPFC–striatal network
(Kable and Glimcher, 2007). Our ﬁnding that distinct representations
of immediate and long-term values are tracked in the brain ﬁts better
with the idea of two competing value systems. However, we note that
long-term value in our task includes both immediate and delayed com-
ponents of value. Thus, our data is consistent with the notion that both
value components are integrated within vmPFC (Economides et al.,
2014; Hare et al., 2009). Importantly, if the separate encoding of imme-
diate and long-term values is linked to the observed trade-off between
these values during choice, we would expect between-subject variabil-
ity in self-control to correlate with the strength with which long-term
valuewas represented relative to immediate value. Speciﬁcally, a stron-
ger representation of long-term relative to immediate value should
track greater self-control. Indeedwewould also expect that representa-
tions of immediate and long-term values would be altered in trials
where subjects (incorrectly) accepted a 7-token offer compared to
when subjects (correctly) resisted the temptation.
To test the ﬁrst prediction, we correlated parameter estimates for
the onset of 7-token offers with the trade-off parameter which captures
theweighting placed on immediate versus long-term value (for 7-token
offers), for each of the four fROIs. The parameter estimateswere derived
from GLM 1 (see Fig. 3) and correspond to offers early in a trial where
accepting a 7-token offer is detrimental overall despite yielding a large
immediate reward. The weighting parameter effectively provides a
measure of self-control for each individual player, although our task
cannot distinguish whether subjects that over-accept 7-token offers
do so because they overweight immediate value, or alternatively be-
cause they underweight the future consequences of accepting a high
value offer (and thus miscalculate long-term value). Although we failed
to identify any correlations that survived the most conservative correc-
tion for multiple comparisons (across the four fROIs), we nonetheless
found a correlation between BOLD activation in response to 7-token of-
fers and the trade-off parameter for 7-token offers in ventral vmPFC
(r2 = 0.25, p = 0.015), that we report here as an exploratory result
(see Fig. 4). In this region of vmPFC, a higher BOLD activation (implying
a greater weighting on face value) in response to 7-token offers was
linked to impulsively accepting (trade-off parameter ﬁt closer to 0),
while a lower BOLD activation (implying a greater weighting on long-
term value) was linked to foregoing the option (trade-off parameter
ﬁt closer to 1).
In addition to observing variability in self-control between subjects,
players were also highly variable in their ability to exercise control
across trials. To test the prediction that trial-by-trial switches between
controlled and impulsive choices are linked to a change in the represen-
tation of immediate or long-term value, we constructed a newGLM(see
the Materials & methods section, GLM 3) where we split 7-token offers
contingent upon whether they were (incorrectly) accepted or(correctly) resisted. This analysis once again focused on the subset of of-
fers that fall inside the yellowbox in Fig. 2A.Wenote that although a dif-
ference in BOLD between go and nogo at the time of cue onset could
reﬂect a modulation of value representation, it could also be driven by
the execution of a motor response in one condition and not the other.
To control for this motor confound, we regressed out button presses
using a motor regressor that included a large proportion of button
presses from outside of the yellow box in Fig. 2A. However, we cannot
fully exclude the possibility that any difference observed might be driv-
en by the anticipation of an upcoming action.
Bearing in mind this caveat, we found that a BOLD response to a 7-
token offer was on average less negative in lateral (paired t(14) =
3.734, p = 0.002, mean b difference = 0.309) but not ventral (paired
t(14) = 0.103, p = 0.919, mean b difference = 0.0215) vmPFC, and
more positive in bilateral anterior caudate (left caudate: paired
t(14) = 2.068, p = 0.06, mean b difference = 0.772; right caudate:
paired t(14)=2.413, p=0.030,mean b difference=0.780)when sub-
jects chose to incorrectly accept compared to correctly reject (Fig. 3).
Thus, impulsive responses were accompanied by a weaker representa-
tion of long-term value within lateral vmPFC and an enhanced repre-
sentation of immediate value in bilateral caudate, while optimal
choices followed the reverse pattern. This proﬁle implies that the repre-
sentational ﬁdelity of one aspect of a value computation may be pro-
moted at the expense of the other.
Previous studies show that self-control recruits the dorsal prefrontal
cortex (dPFC) with evidence suggesting that this region acts to initiate
inhibitory control (Aron et al., 2004) or to modulate the representation
of valuewithin valuation regions (Diekhof andGruber, 2010; Hare et al.,
2009). While our primary interest with imaging was to identify the
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conjectured that activity in dPFC might scale with the demand for con-
trol, and that this in turn may contribute towards the observed repre-
sentations of value. Within a subset of offers at the start of each trial
(yellow box in Fig. 2A), 7-token offers require ampliﬁed self-control rel-
ative to 3 and 5-token offers, as the immediate value of accepting a 7-
token offer here is most decorrelated from the overall long-term
value. Thus, the BOLD response in regions enacting ‘control’ should be
enhanced in response to 7-token offers, diminished in response to 5-
token offers, and modestly enhanced in response to 3-token offers.
Note that this is the opposite proﬁle to that observed in vmPFC that en-
codes long-term (overall) value (see Figs. 3A and C). We tested for this
in a contrast ({0−1 1} for 3, 5 and 7-token offers) using GLM 1 where
we identiﬁed activation in a frontal network including anterior cingu-
late cortex and right inferior frontal gyrus that survived whole-brain
correction (see Table S3 for all areas).
Inline Supplementary Table S3 can be found online at http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.12.071.
Thus, activity in these regions did not scale with value but instead
with the demand for control (Fig. 5). We note that these regions are
strongly implicated in cognitive control (Kerns et al., 2004), response in-
hibition (Aron et al., 2004) and self-regulated choice (Hare et al., 2009).
Discussion
Both vmPFC and striatum are implicated in computing value for ac-
tion selection (Brovelli et al., 2011; FitzGerald et al., 2012; Guitart-Masip
et al., 2012; Tricomi et al., 2004; Wunderlich et al., 2012), and these re-
gions are differentially activated when individuals choose immediate
versus delayed rewards (McClure et al., 2004).Whether this distinction
arises from divergent computational roles has remained unclear. Here,
we used a computational formalization to address how vmPFC and stri-
atum arbitrate between immediate and long-term values where these
are dissociable and can motivate differing actions. Further, by contrast-
ing incorrect and correct decisions we could map the computational
mechanisms that contribute towards impulsive or controlled choice
respectively.
Previous studies have proposed that choice utilizes a common value
system based on vmPFC (Hare et al., 2009), or on a vmPFC–striatal loop
(Kable and Glimcher, 2007). Consistent with this, we identiﬁed a value
representation in vmPFC that takes into account the immediate and de-
layed consequences of actions. However, in contrast to the common
value framework, we identiﬁed a separate representation of immediate
value in anterior caudate that likely impacts action selection in parallel,
and in a fashion that often opposes a course of action endorsed byFig. 5. Activity in the brain scaleswith the requirement for action control. BOLD responsewithin
offers compared to 3 and 5-token offers, and thus scaled with the demand for control. The beta
SEM. * indicates p = b 0.05; n.s. indicates not signiﬁcant (paired t-tests); see also Inline SupplvmPFC. In this scheme, failures of self-control stem from a degraded
representation of long-term value in lateral vmPFC and a concurrent
enhancement of immediate value within the anterior caudate. Analo-
gously, successful control is dependent not only on an accurate repre-
sentation of long-term value in lateral vmPFC, but also an attenuation
of immediate value in anterior caudate.
There are several possible explanations for the discrepancy between
our ﬁnding that the brain represents dual values and previous accounts
that it uses a single value system. In the Hare dietary choice paradigm
(Hare et al., 2009), subjects chose between a reference food item and al-
ternatives that varied in healthiness and tastiness. The authors then
asked whether the BOLD response signiﬁcantly correlated with taste
or health ratings in subjects who demonstrated either high or low ca-
pacity for self-control. However, this analysis was conﬁned to the
vmPFC, and it is possible that activity in the anterior caudate may
have tracked taste ratings in a manner similar to the immediate value
representations that we observed in our data. Further, while tastiness
and healthiness map onto different outcome modalities, our task con-
siders immediate and long-term value attributes within a single
modality.
A second prominent study closely aligned with the single value ac-
count utilized an intertemporal choice paradigm to probe preference
for rewards at differing time-scales (Kable and Glimcher, 2007). Here,
subjects had to choose between an immediately available sum of
money and a larger but delayed alternative. Similar to results reported
here, Kable and Glimcher found that vmPFC (among other regions)
computes the subjective value of the chosen option. However, since
the immediate reward was kept constant in their design, it remains un-
known whether this value is tracked separately in the brain.
In a follow-up study, the authors modiﬁed their paradigm to include
trials in which subjects chose between a smaller amount of money paid
at a sooner time (but not immediately) and a larger amount paid at a
later time (Kable and Glimcher, 2010). Here the authors found that ac-
tivity within the same value regions as their previous study (Kable
and Glimcher, 2007) encodes subjective value on an absolute scale
that depends on duration of delay from the present. Further, the authors
report a failure to ﬁnd evidence that activity in these regions is higher
when an immediate option is present as compared to when both op-
tions are delayed. The latter suggests that a proposed short-sighted neu-
ral value system may not simply represent the presence of an
immediate reward, but rather may be sensitive to contexts in which
the largest available reward is paired with a less favorable outcome in
the long-term. Interestingly, the largest offer is always paired with a
delay in temporal discounting studies, and in this sense is never imme-
diately available. Another possibility is that the short-sighted system isa frontal network including ACC, rIFG and bilateral insula cortex,was enhanced for 7-token
s for a region in the rIFG (circled in red) are plotted for illustration. Vertical lines represent
ementary Table S3.
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requirement for these to be inferred. In contrast to this, the delay to re-
ward is explicitly cued in intertemporal choice paradigms. Lastly, the
paradigm employed by these authors poses an interesting question re-
garding whether a proposed short-sighted system is exclusively sensi-
tive to “immediate” reward, or rather to rewards merely closest to the
present (though this goes beyond the scope of the present study).
Another important consideration is that unlike the previous studies,
our task did not require a choice between two options presented simul-
taneously. Rather, subjects were required to ﬂexibly approach or avoid
an option with both immediate and delayed consequences, spanning
both action and valence (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012). This action depen-
dency was adopted so as to more closely resemble natural settings,
where self-control often involves arbitration between approach and
avoidance, and where the value of choice options often change dynam-
ically. Given that the striatum is heavily implicated in both action and
value processing (Guitart-Masip et al., 2014; Rothwell, 2011; Samejima
et al., 2005), and that the distinction between these roles is not clearly
deﬁned, anterior caudate may in fact integrate value with a propensity
to act during go/nogo judgments (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011, 2012;
Roesch et al., 2009). In turn, this contribution may be absent in self-
control tasks, such as intertemporal choice tasks, that do not pair the
prepotent choice (accepting a large immediate reward) with a prepo-
tent action (the execution of a ‘go’ response). Other evidence that task
modality can impact value coding comes from a recent ﬁnding that
switching the frame of reference used for decision-making alters pat-
terns of value coding in the brain (Hunt et al., 2013).
In humans, activity in vmPFC has been shown to include a represen-
tation of healthiness in individuals who resist temptation for unhealthy
foods (Hare et al., 2009), a ﬁnding complimented by evidence that
vmPFC acts to integrate multiple components of value (Wunderlich
et al., 2012). Further, in rodents, the orbitofrontal cortex has been
shown to compute values based on anticipation of latent outcomes
(Jones et al., 2012), while patients with bilateral vmPFC lesions demon-
strate reduced sensitivity to future consequence and increased reliance
on immediate rewards (Bechara et al., 2000). However, to the best of
our knowledge, no previous study has demonstrated a value signal in
human vmPFC that reﬂects an overall (long-term) value that is
decoupled from short-sighted valuations related to the presence of an
immediate reward or a smaller–sooner option. This points to the likeli-
hood that vmPFC draws on contextual information to calculate an over-
all expectation of value (Hampton et al., 2006; Jones et al., 2012;
McDannald et al., 2011; Takahashi et al., 2013), while other valuation
regions may only be privy to immediate outcomes.
We found that value coding in amore ventral region of vmPFC is de-
pendent on subjects' baseline ability to appropriately adjust a prepotent
response, raising an important question regarding the underlying
mechanism. One conjecture is that this region lacks access to represen-
tations required for inferring long-term value in impulsive players. This
may be related to a weaker functional connectivity between this region
of vmPFC and more dorsal prefrontal cortex regions associated with
goal-directed control (Hare et al., 2009, 2014). By contrast, value coding
in amore lateral region of vmPFCwaspredictive of upcoming choice in a
context requiring self-control. While we can only speculate as to the
functional differences between these regions, one possibility is that
the ventral portion encodes long-term value regardless of context,
whereas themore lateral portion integrates long-term value with addi-
tional components that contribute to the action selection process, and is
thus more representative of upcoming choice. Interestingly, a recent
study has identiﬁed a similar pattern of differential reward processing
within subregions of vmPFC in non-human primates (Monosov and
Hikosaka, 2012).
Our ﬁnding that anterior caudate predominantly tracks immediate
value is surprising given previous accounts that this region represents
the utility of actions by differentiating between positive and negative
consequences (Tricomi et al., 2004), or computing values for plannedchoice (Wunderlich et al., 2012) and future reward prediction (Tanaka
et al., 2004). A long-line of animal research has implicated the
dorsomedial striatum (the caudate homologue in rodents) in
representing the consequences of an animal's actions, with lesions to
this region impairing the acquisition of R–O contingencies (Yin et al.,
2005). Yet, much of the animal literature relies on devaluation para-
digms that utilize immediate outcomes (Balleine and O'Doherty,
2010). Similarly, experiments in humans have implicated anterior cau-
date in outcome devaluation (Valentin et al., 2007) and in tracking con-
tingencies between actions and outcomes (Tanaka et al., 2008), yet
often do not require valuations that integrate immediate and long-
term consequences. Thus, one possibility is that both vmPFC and anteri-
or caudate support goals by representing outcomes (Valentin et al.,
2007), while vmPFC predominantly receives the input required to cal-
culate long-term value. An alternative interpretation, given a ﬁnding
that at least some component of the anterior caudate response is ex-
plained by long-term value, is that this region contains populations of
neurons tuned to either immediate or long-term value respectively.
We note that although we used a model-based tree search to deﬁne
overall value for the purposes of our analysis, our task cannot differen-
tiate between model-based versus alternate choice strategies. For ex-
ample, the use of heuristics may be more probable given the
complexity of the tree search. Further, subjects' probability of accepting
an offer between offer indexes 2 and 3 in a trial (see Fig. 2A, yellow
boxes) is somewhat uniform, and this choice pattern is not well-
captured by the winning model. Yet our key interest lay in exploring
the behavioral and neural consequences of dissociating immediate
from overall (long-term) value, and the trade-off model provides cor-
roborative evidence that subjects take both quantities into account. An
important follow-up question is whether long-term value is calculated
online by projecting into the future, or whether it is cached and re-
trieved in a model-free framework following a sufﬁcient number of
trials.
Our data have a number of implications. Comorbidity between im-
pulsivity and selected psychiatric disorders is well-documented
(Moeller et al., 2001), raising an interesting question as to the relation-
ship between the biological substrates of these disorders and the disso-
ciable value representations that we identify. Our task might provide a
novel avenue for probing this, including assessing the impact of both be-
havioral and pharmacological interventions. Finally, given a strong asso-
ciation between affective state and the capacity for self-control, the
dual-value framework that we outline could be useful for evaluating
the impact of emotion, mood, stress, and other state-dependent factors
on the representation of immediate and long-term values, and the
resulting impact on decision-making in these contexts.Acknowledgments
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